Announcing voice2words website

Today at last my new business website was launched -see http://www.voice2words.com.au/

Here is how we introduce ourselves..

At voice2words, we help organisations hear the many voices that make up their business, client-base or community.

For strategic decisions in the social sphere, a deep understanding of human motivations and needs is key. Our qualitative research represents voice through words that are evocative and practical, leading to new perspectives.

We believe that voice works. It allows us to ask the difficult questions and identify creative solutions. It protects vital relationships and improves outcomes.

Harnessing the power of voice, we enable organisations to address unspoken issues, identify misunderstandings and establish dialogue. Our dialogue facilitation goes beyond mere talk. Encouraging genuine participation from all sides, we help bridge divisions, build trust and discover new ways to move forward.

At voice2words, it is our business to be doing reconciliation and dialogue as well as writing about it!

Books, Books, Books: 'Forgiveness and Revenge' - Trudy Govier.

Hi there folks, my apologies for my long unexplained absence.

'There is a time to scatter stones and a time to gather them.' I have been gathering stones...

Here is one to throw your way.

Have you ever considered another's concept and demand for justice to be a form of justified revenge?

Let me recommend to you the book: 'Forgiveness and Revenge', by Trudy Govier. Routledge, 2002. ISBN: 0-415-27855 -4.

Govier superbly and logically expounds the finer distinctions in common arguments about revenge and retributive justice, and addresses the question: Can Groups Forgive?

Here is the blurb on the back of her book -
"Govier argues that the revenge is objectionable for practical and moral reasons. She explores the relationship between revenge and retribution, and the distinction between vindictiveness and a desire for vindication. Crucially, Govier poses the question, are some crimes unforgiveable? She argues that forgiving does not require condoning, excusing or forgetting, using the political forgiveness as an example. She also defends the idea that the notions of revenge and forgiveness can be applied to groups of people, not just individuals, and looks for the repurcussions of this on peace and reconciliation."

You may not agree with all of what she says, but her arguments are brilliant and it is certainly worth a read..

Newtown Graffiti: Are their ghosts on your fence?

Oh., its another ghost..!

This graffitti in newtown caught my eye in that it captures perfectly the silliness of two ghosts being scared of each other.. an apt picture of what often occurs when we attempt to dialogue with the neighbor across the fence. Ghosts from the past, our fears, come back to haunt us. Yet ironically, this is exactly what 'the other' ghost is feeling and thinking. Recognition of elements of your own experience and struggles in the other, our shared 'ghostness', help to overcome this. I suspect that this will help to prevent our backyard fences becoming walls, that block out relationship altogether.

Are their ghosts on your fence?

Books, Books, Books: 'War and Reconciliation: reason and emotion in conflict resolution'.

Yesterday, I picked up a new book "War and reconciliation: reason and emotion in conflict resolution". Long, W.J and Brecke, P. 2003. Massachustsetts Institue of technology (MIT Press); Cambridge. ISBN 0262122545. For those of us interested in academic research in reconciliation and conflict it looks very useful. It presents a compelling arguement for corporate symboilic reconciliation processses in the healing of nation-wide wounds. I must say that the implications of the evidential base that is presented in this book on the impact of symbolic national apologies in peace-building is very interesting, and relevant in the Australian context of apology to our 'tribal warriors'.


Here is it's preface.


"This project began during a conversation between the authors about a visit to the yerkes regional primate research centre. There, Peter had observed a presentation on primate conflict resolution by renowned animal behaviourists Frans de Waal. De Waal's team observed that a public symbolic reconciliation between warring primate after a fight had a pronounced positive effect in restoring order within our groupings.

We remarked how public, symbolic gestures by leaders of disputants in human societies become front page news, stayed firmly in our memories, and carried the strong presumption that these symbolic acts were associated with a reduction in future conflict between the groups the leaders represented. As political scientists we wondered, do reconciliation events - public, symmbolic meetings between beligerents indicating a desire for improved relations - help restore lasting social order after wars, both civit and international? Is there empirical support for this presumption, and if so how and why do such events contribute to long-run restoration of social order? Furthermore, we found that these intriguing questions had gone largely univestigated by social scientists.

This book attempts to answer these questions. The questions that we ultmately uncovered proved more interesting than we can have imagined. We discovered that reconciliation events were associated with reductions in international conflict because they operated as a form of costly trustworthy signal that, under certain conditions, de-escalated violence and restored order. That such events served as succesful signalling devices in international bargaining is consistent with the rational choice approach to conflict resolution. By making costly, reliable signals of a desire for improved relations, reconciliation events could serve as a dependable concession that changed the expected pay-offs facing parties so as to encourage them to choose peace."

More surprising, we found that these events also often correlated with the restoration of order after civil conflicts, but for very different reasons. There they helped to reduce future conflict when they were a part of an emotionally laden process of social forgiveness. That finding does not fit within existing models of rational decision making, however, and it opens the door to a radically different view of rationality and human problem solving. Unlike rational choice, which assumes that reason operates apart from the emotion in applying universally logical principles to solving all types of problems, the forgiveness finding recommends a new approach to understanding rationality and choice. It argues for a model of human problem solving that integrates emotional and logic, and recognises that we have numerous problem solving approaches to address different types of problems."

I do have to say I was surprised at thier surprise!

I couldn't help thinking in reading the preface that I would end up thinking there was some major pitfalls in framing reconciliation as an emotional process, within in a moral vaccum (This, I believe, was hinted at in this preface and would be a natural logic of one of the main philosophical assumptions underpinning of the book, that the essential nature of humanity stems from his/her identity as evolutionary 'man/woman'). Surely this misses the whole point. The heart of reconciliation, its essential nature, is moral rather than emotional. To frame it purely as emotional, presents a danger of treating public reconcilation discourse as a rhetoric that is disconnected from and does not accurately reflect the relationships processes involved. Such rhetoric can be potentially manipulative.

I was also troubled by the authors framing of reconciliation as a concession in the calcuation of 'pay-offs' within the negotation of conflict resultion. Perhaps this is actually how observers rather than genuine participants of a national apology processes approach it. But there is no sea-change here. Reconciliation presents a entirely new paradigm for dealing with wrongs done. It shifts problem solving about relationship breakdown from an expedient outcomes outlook (what is going to work in fixing this) to a rights framework. Once responsibility for wrongs done is acknowledged by both parties - the restoration of victim's claim on rights and the loss of perpetrators claim to rights in the bargaining process is evidently clear to those involved. It is in this new framework of bargaining that powerful breakthroughs through entrenched societal divisions come. Emotional responses signal these breakthroughs, these sea changes in relationships, for emotion itself illustrates and signals deep relational truths (where one's emotional life has not been injured to the point of being disconnected from authenticitic relationship processes).

I don't know if the authors of this book were doing this - but I believe that an attempt to interpret and explain the phenomena of reconciliation through the lens of conflict resolution, is problematic. At its worst, it could undermine good done, by reframing the reconciliation process within a paradigm that can at best manage the injury and fall out of entrenched relational conflict - but cannot heal relationships or the relational damage already incurred.

National apology: Responsibility and the Deconstruction of guilt

Nelson's complex analysis of the causes for our history with the indigenous peoples, alongside his detailed comments about who was at fault or not at fault, reminded me of one of the last passages in Lionel Shivers novel, "Lets talk about Kevin". In this novel in which a mother writes to her (dead) husband, recording her internal struggle in resolving issues of personal guilt following her son's massacre of his school fellows, and his father and sister (see also previous posts). Here she describes the angst of a convoluted inner journey of deconstructing guilt, and a surprising way in which it is resolved.

"But since then - and throughout writing these letters to you - I have come full circle, making a journey much like Kevin's own. In asking petulantly whether Thursday was my fault, I have had to go backward to deconstruct. It is possible that I am asking the wrong questions. In any event, by thrashing between exoneration and excoriation, I have tired myself out. I don't know. At the end of the day, I have no idea, and that pure serene ignorance , itself, is a funny kind of solace. The truth is, if I decided I was innocent, or I decided I was guilty, what difference would it make? If I arrived at the right answer, would you come home?" (Lionel Shriver, 2003, Persues Book Groups, NY, pg ).

In the wake of a 'great harm' the deconstruction of guilt and responsibility for what has occurred can become an elaborate internal minefield. In situations where two or more people's actions contribute to a situation, it is a challenge to obtain precision in the attribution of responsibility for an event. Untwisting the threads of personal responsibility among a group of actors can be especially difficult if one seeks to identify where responsibility lies in a chain of reactions of cause and effect. This is well demonstrated in the core question this book grapples with, to what extent is a mother responsible for her son's mass murder, and why? (particularly when she is aware that her emotional 'absence' and 'spurning' of her son from early years helped form a wounded psychology, from his actions sprung?) If someone is responsible for wounding another, should they also be held responsible for their victims choices and deeds enacted 'out of these wounds'? Personally, I don't think that the conflux of responsibilities in this case is appropriate. Someone can feel guilt for inflicting a wound that created a pull towards or temptation for a harmful behaviour, without taking responsibility for the victim's choices to act out of that.

There is a place for untangling the threads of responsibility from false feelings of guilt, and the discomfort of 'shared shame', shame that comes from the being associated with a family member's actions (or other group from which we belong). Such complexity of mental thought can be taxing in itself. However, from what Shriver described here, her mental exhaustion did not arise from the exertion required for this complex mental task. Rather, it appeared to come from the emotional exhaustion of unsuccesful self-defense against the arrows of internal accusation. I say unsucessful because of the self confessed flip-flop that she experienced between self-exoneration and self-excoriation. One minute you are experience the temporary relief of self-exoneration, only to have that illusion collapses... None of the defences that she came up with, could be sustained... there were loopholes in the argument. Such a flip-flop can also arise from the false logic of moral binary thinking - that suggest in each situation there is a villian and and an angel - which one are you? .. flip flop ! Such forms of self denial actually recreate the complexity that they seek to resolve, for it is within a labyrinth of complex thoughts that you are enabled to hide from that reality you are seeking to deny.

What I found surprising here, is the way in which she resolved her struggle with guilt. She did not admit guilt, on the grounds that it was too hard. Is she dissolved from guilt in her inability to resolve the problem of the exact nature of her responsibility? Was she not really saying it was too hard to admit the part that she was feeling guilty for, so that she would prefer to hold on to the messy labyrinth of thought.. this excuse for resolution..this tangle of thoughts which was clearly 'not quite right'? In my own life I have found that in this exhausted thrashing around, the only way to find rest is to admit guilt and the need for 'mercy' and love in 'the other'.

Could this also be a temptation to us as a community in dealing with the real complexities with our past?

An indigenous woman

I came across this early representation of an Indigenous woman that was on display at an historical house I visited with a girlfriend, 'Glenfield'. I was struck by the masculisation of the figure and the artificialness of the smile with the shiny white teeth.

I have just had the privilege of reading several chapters of Meredith's PHD thesis which were a fascinating reconstruction of the link between the original Anglican Chaplain and a young Aboriginal girl named Baroon, one of the first indigenous people to come into and live in the 'camp' - see her blog 'Faith and Place', particularly this post on her writing about this issue (http://faith-and-place.blogspot.com/2007/07/busy-writing.html.). She explores the difficult issue of how the early chaplains of the Anglicna church were complicit in the colonising process, (despite being motivated out of an entirely different set of intentions to those who governed the colony.)

It reminded me of the difficult ethical dilemma that many of the medical profession had several years ago in deciding whether or not the provide medical services to refugees in the detention centres, when they firmly believed that the detention system itself was the cause of major mental health problems that were evident in this population of refugees. (see http://www.mja.com.au/public/issues/175_12_171201/sultan/sultan.html for further info). Not to do so would be to provide refugees with no relief to thier physical ailments. To do so meant participating in a system that caused much psychological suffering and injury to those detained.

Was this also the ethical dilemma of the first chaplains to the colony? Could it be that those who willingly chose to share in the 'exile' of the convicts in order to offer 'spiritual services' and ministry to those in Sydneytown, could not be a part of the system, without actually becoming an agents of the system? ... and so unwittingly became instruments of colonisation.

Yet not to do so would be to leave the colony without Christain services that offered people spiritual comfort. Perhaps it is only a dilemma in hindsight, not one that they recognised and struggled with at the time. But it is our dilemma as Christains today as we wrestle with our role (corporately) as a church in this part of our history, and our need to say sorry...

National Apology: Responsibility and Empathy

Recently I had a few days away at ‘my place’, Bawley Point, where I encountered a tale about Brendan Nelson. Apparently, he has discovered this idyllic place, and it is only 2 hours from Canberra. Local gossip theorises that Tony Abbot introduced him to Bawley, as he is known to holiday there. No-one can go incognito in Bawley, as it is such a small sea village, let alone a Brendan Nelson. There is only one café where you can get a decent coffee at Bawley – affectionately dubbed by the locals as Alan’s – because, of course, it is Alan’s! Alan knows his clientele so well that every time he sees my green Kermit-like Daewoo pull up, he automatically pulls out the python jelly snakes off the shelf in readiness for my order (one of my inner child indulgences). Needless to say, I now feel I cannot go into the cafe without purchasing a python jelly snake!

Apparently, Brendan Nelson stood at the same spot on the other side of the counter and ordered a cappuccino. He also thanked the proprietor for ‘what they do’. This man who caused such disgust and pain, was suddenly humanized for me. That same weekend (April 5, 2008), the Sydney Morning Herald Good Weekend published an editorial about him, which depicted him as a man of compassion in many relationships, who quickly identifies with pain, and perhaps tries too hard to please everyone. I see a man who genuinely and sincerely believes he is a nice and moral man. Others have presented Brendan as a chameleon, who was playing a political game of appeasement and representation of party political views on Sorry Day in order to arrest the leadership. However, when I look at him (though the eyes of the media), I see something a bit more complex. I see some coherence in his world view about indigenous issues and about the nature of apology, something that given his personal exposure to the Indigenous Australia does not come from a place of naivety or ignorance. It is something that is important to understand in more depth, especially to the extent that it represents the world views of other Australian citizens, I admit, to my surprise, one or two of my friends.

What I have found particularly interesting in the public dialogue about the Sorry Day was the different ways in which people used the same term ‘sorry’ - and the lack of analysis about the various meanings that people attached to the word ‘sorry’. I think this is particularly important to understanding the Brendan Nelson’s apology and in reconciling the offence of his speech with his own seeming belief in the sincerity of his own apology.

A book that I have been reading recently “The five languages of apology: How to experience healing in your relationships” by Chapman, G and Thomas, J. Northfield Publishing, Chicago. (ISBN 1 881273 79 2). It presents 5 common modes of apology and argues that when someone does not use the apology language of the person to whom they are addressing, the other person may not feel that the other person has really apologized, or that it is a genuine apology. The 5 languages of apology are: i) Expressing regret “I am sorry’ (here regret focuses on what you did or failed to do and how it affected the other person); ii) Accepting responsibility “I was wrong”; iii) Making restitution “What can I do to make it right”’ iv) Genuinely repenting “I’ll try not to do that again”; v) Requesting forgiveness “Will you please forgive me?”

My observations of Brendan’s behavior throughout the Sorry Day debate suggested to me that he does not view apology to be primarily about acknowledging responsibility, but to be primarily about expressing regret, or empathy for a person’s pain. This was most clearly demonstrated in his apology to the Indigenous woman, Faye Lynam, who expressed distress at the way Brendan Nelson misrepresented her in his Sorry Day Speech. A spokesperson reported that ‘Brendan rang Faye last night ad said to her if there was anything in the speech that she felt was offensive or hurtful, he apologized for that.’ (Fresh apology demanded for Nelson speech, SMH, February 16-17, 2008). It also makes sense of his personality as one who quickly feels others pain, if this is his primary apology language.

Material in ‘5 languages of apology’ demonstrates that an apology that focuses on ‘regret’, does not at the same time necessarily disown responsibility for the behavior. It gave an example of an apology of regret would say – “I know that at I hurt you very deeply. That causes me immense pain. I am truly sorry for what I did.” However, there is a type of apology that expresses regret for the consequences, but does not own up to any responsibility or ‘blame’ (in the non vindictive sense of the word) for an action. Stripping an apology from the assignment of responsibility or blame makes it much easier to do, especially if you are feeling guilty! During the sorry day coverage, this type of apology was articulated by Steve Fielding (a Victorian family first senator) in the following words:

“SAYING sorry shouldn't be so hard. It is not about blame. It is about being genuinely sorry. Sorry that the other person has been hurt, even if the action was unintentional.”

CS Lewis wrote on the difference between asking someone to forgive and someone to excuse you; in a way that demonstrates that some form of acknowledgment of responsibility is needed for reconciliation processes within a relationship.

"I find that when I think I am asking God to forgive me I am often in reality asking Him not to forgive me but to excuse me. But there is all the difference in the world between forgiving and excusing. Forgiveness says ‘Yes you have done this thing, but I accept your apology. I will never hold it against you and everything between us two will be exactly as it was before.’ But excusing says “I see that you couldn’t help it or didn’t mean it, you weren’t really to blame’. If one is not really to blame then there is nothing to forgive. In that sense, forgiving and excusing are almost opposites". From 'On forgiveness', in Fern-seed and Elephants.

Perhaps this is what caused so much disgust and offence during the Sorry Day speech.